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Against the claims of assorted cultural relativists and multiculturalists, Brian Barry argues for the universal validity of liberal egalitarianism. He writes: ‘I continue to believe in the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’ (Barry 1995a: 3), and his concern to stress that universality is such that he has claimed that ‘[t]he point of liberalism is that it is universalistic’ (Barry 2001: 138). In contrast, Richard Rorty writes of his desire to ‘reformulate the hopes of liberal society in a nonrationalist and nonuniversalist way – one which furthers their realization better than older descriptions of them did’ (Rorty 1989: 44 – 45). By talking of ‘[a]bandoning universalism’ (Rorty 1989: 68), Rorty seems not only to be at odds with many liberals but, in so far as Barry is correct in identifying the point of liberalism to be its universality, may be thought to have excluded himself from counting as a liberal at all. 






Liberalism and reason 

Rorty’s abandonment of universalism concerns the Kantian notion of universal validity, in which unconditional obligations follow from the deliverance of pure practical reason. Today this idea is endorsed by, among others, Thomas Nagel. Nagel argues that when considering how to act, it is not sufficient to take what he calls the ‘first personal’ perspective, but rather one should take the perspective such that anyone else in that situation should reach the same conclusion. For him, reason ‘should enable anyone else also to see what is the right thing for you to do against that background’ (Nagel 1997: 110). Rorty, by contrast, argues that reason cannot yield substantive conclusions. Reason is not a faculty that exists prior to, and structures, human behaviour, but is rather a summation of the contingent patterns of behaviour exhibited by humans when interacting with each other and the world. There is nothing more to rationality than the practices of reasoning exhibited by human beings in specific situations: ‘we would do well’, he writes, ‘to abandon the notion of certain values (“rationality”, “disinterestedness”) floating free of the educational and institutional patterns of the day’ (Rorty 1979: 331). In questions of morality, Rorty suggests that we focus on reasonableness, a contextual notion informed by particular beliefs and intitutions. As such, the content of reasonableness is always contested; there is, he accepts, ‘no non-question-begging demonstration of the epistemic superiority of the Western idea of reasonableness’ (Rorty 2001: 230).
 
In contrast, Barry sometimes makes claims that indicate that he thinks reason plays a substantial role in justifying liberal principles. He writes for example that liberal views of ‘consistency of treatment, according to intelligible criteria, could be not unaptly described as a demand of Reason’ (Barry 2001: 16). Individuals equally situated should face equal tax liabilities, and their not doing so is, he continues, ‘revolting to Reason in this sense’. Whilst Rorty would certainly agree that this is would be unreasonable, the capitalisation of ‘Reason’ suggests that Barry intends to make a stronger claim, that reason itself dictates the necessity of consistency of treatment. That is, he intimates something that Rorty thinks impossible, namely that reason could demand anything. 

This claim is, I suggest, an aberration in Barry’s writings. For generally he is clear that we cannot ask too much of the notion of reason or rationality. In response to Richard Arneson’s suggestion that states should seek to justify their policies by reference to neutral reasons, ‘reasons that all citizens can share in so far as they are rational’ (Arneson 1998: 67), Barry responds that ‘[t]his rules out either virtually nothing or virtually everything’ (Barry 1998: 239). It rules out virtually nothing if it means that a person’s actions can be understood, and that others can grasp the reasoning that led to that course of action. Accepting this does not, however, mean that it is irrational to fail to accept that course of action to be the right one.  






I suggest therefore that Barry’s use of the term ‘universal validity’ is very different from the Kantian claim of unconditional obligation arising from pure practical reason. Barry means that liberalism is universally valid not because of the demands of reason, but because it is the universally desirable means by which humans should organise their lives. This view stems from a belief in the equality of human beings and the right of every individual to choose her own ends, coupled with agnosticism about the availability of any means to determine and justify the good life or any uniquely rational way to judge or adjudicate between different ends. Barry argues that liberalism addresses those differences by providing for the maximum degree of freedom of belief and action consistent with the enjoyment of those freedoms by people who adhere to different views of the good. As he puts it, ‘[t]he basic idea of liberalism is to create a set of rights under which people are treated equally in certain respects, and then to leave them to deploy these rights (alone or in association with others) in the pursuit of their own ends’ (Barry 1996: 538). He has no desire to limit the diversity of individual or collective enterprises, unless their purposes bring individuals and groups into conflict with others.

Rorty would seem to agree. He proposes:

a story of increasing willingness to live with plurality and to stop asking for universal validity. I want to see freely arrived at agreement as agreement on how to accomplish common purposes (e.g., prediction and control of the behavior of atoms or people, equalizing life-chances, decreasing cruelty), but I want to see these common purposes against the background of an increasing sense of the radical diversity of private purposes, of the radically poetic character of individual lives, and of the merely poetic foundations of the “we-consciousness” which lies behind our social institutions (Rorty 1989: 67 – 68).

Unlike Barry, Rorty contrasts the liberal aspiration for a framework in which individuals are free to pursue with own ideas of the good and valuable life with the pursuit of universal validity. But in so doing, the difference between their usages of universal validity becomes apparent. For Rorty joins Barry in arguing that individuals should be left free to create themselves; as he puts it, ‘One of my aims in this book [Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity] is to suggest the possibility of a liberal utopia: one in which ironism, in the relevant sense, is universal’ (Rorty 1989: xv). Ironism, standing in contrast to common sense, he takes to concern self-creation and the refusal uncritically to accept inherited descriptions, typically those of one’s community or culture. Once we give up on the notion of a single best (‘universally valid’) human life, liberalism is required precisely because it provides the freedoms for us to construct our own views of the good. 

For them both, liberalism is justified not be reference to notions of rationality, but in terms of what they take to be its fairness. Barry writes: 

[Liberal] principles can be arrived at in a number of alternative ways. In the past, especially, God and Nature have been widely invoked to provide a foundation. In common with most contemporary egalitarian liberal philosophers, I disclaim any such grandiose designs. I suggest simply that liberal principles are the fairest way of adjudicating the disputes that inevitably arise as a result of conflicting interests and incompatible beliefs about the social conditions of the good life (Barry 2001: 122).

He happily accepts Alasdair MacIntyre’s purported criticism of liberalism, that the starting point for liberal theorising is liberal principles, and that liberalism is not neutral between every conception of the good (Barry 1991: 119, 38 – 39). Complete neutrality between forms of the good is obviously impossible, since some views of the good will conflict with the right. For him, such controversy is itself a reason to set these issues aside and focus on fairness. Similarly, Rorty suggests that there is no fairer or more just alternative to liberalism, given the circumstances of modern pluralist societies. This point is, he thinks, demonstrated by comparison with other forms of life.  In what he calls the ideal liberal polity, ‘the justification of liberal society [would be regarded] simply as a matter of historical comparisons with other attempts at social organization – those of the past and those envisaged by utopians’ (Rorty 1989: 53). 


Liberalism and human nature

In Culture and Equality, Barry uses the term ‘anti-universalism’ as a label for multiculturalist and identity theorists who hold that different institutions, laws and rights are appropriate for different cultural groups. He rejects anti-universalism in this sense, arguing that the framework of law should be universal – the same for all – providing individuals the opportunity to pursue their own ends unencumbered by the sort of restriction he believes non-liberal groups impose upon their members. ‘Liberal tolerance’, he writes, ‘extends to the internal affairs of illiberal groups, provided that they stay within the framework of liberal laws. What is not up for grabs, however, is that framework itself’ (Barry 2001: 131).

In this sense of the term, universalism is of equal importance for Rorty. Liberals should, Rorty argues, be concerned with human similarities, not cultural differences. They should attend to the factors that remain the same cross-culturally, such as the concern to avoid pain and humiliation, and hopes for the future:

These ways of emphasising commonality rather than difference have little to do with “cultural recognition.” They have to do with experiences shared by members of all cultures and all historical epochs, and which remain pretty much the same despite cultural change (Rorty 2000c: 11).

He denies that liberals need concern themselves with ‘identity’ in order to give meaning to individual freedom, and rejects the need for what James Tully calls ‘a third-generation norm of legitimacy’ of respect for cultural diversity (Tully 2002: 102). He believes that multiculturalists conflate ‘ethnicity’ and ‘stigma’, thinking that the way to overcome stigma is to ‘recognise’ the cultural identity of stigmatised groups (Rorty et al. 1998: 24 – 25). This he rejects, thinking it sufficient to pursue a politics of difference-blind individualism, which treats others not as members of a particular culture but as fellow human beings. Farid Abdel-Nour has criticised Rorty on this point, for what he thinks of as his failure to engage with ‘the other’s alterity’ and his ‘propensity towards other-disregard’ (Abdel-Nour 2000: 221, 224). As an observation rather than a criticism this is correct, for Rorty believes that liberals need pay no heed to the sources of identity. The question though is whether this is a failing. Rorty joins Barry in thinking that not only is concern with the recognition of identity something that has no significance for liberal politics, but that it stands in the way of pursuing social and economic egalitarianism, both by diverting attention away from that concern and by destroying the conditions of solidarity necessary to support it (Barry 2001: 11, 325 - 6; Rorty et al. 1998: 21 – 31). 

In writing of the ‘we-consciousness’ that lies behind liberal democratic institutions, however, Rorty himself might appear to be proposing a form of communitarian or multiculturalism. Susan Mendus takes Rorty’s discussion of ‘we consciousness’ and ‘we intentions’ to indicate a substantive and therefore potentially exclusionary form of moral identification, arguing that Rorty fails to do justice to moral and cultural plurality by imposing a homogeneous ‘we’ that threatens to substitute one form of essentialism with another: ‘an essentialism which consists in the belief that we must come to see others as like ourselves if we are to have any chance of behaving decently in the world’ (Mendus 1996: 66). Rorty however does not mean anything as substantial as this. The identification of ‘we’ – a term which Rorty uses frequently with different referents, for example ‘we liberals’, ‘we democrats’ – means here the ability to sympathise with those in pain and suffering humiliation, something that as we have seen he takes to be relatively fixed across cultures and historical epochs. He does not believe that we have to see others as people engaged in a common substantive endeavour, or as united in any goal beyond mutual respect for potentially very different projects. He speaks of the importance of separating the question ‘Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?’ from the question ‘Are you suffering?’ (Rorty 1989: 198). For the liberal, what matters, and all that should matter, is whether the ‘other’, whoever they may be, is in pain. This is a very thin sense of seeing others ‘like ourselves’, one which leaves substantive projects such as the pursuit of the good to individuals. 

It seems to me that the only difference between Barry and Rorty is that, in arguing against multiculturalism, Barry sometimes seeks to support his claims by drawing upon a notion of human nature. This is seen in his comments on Tully’s Strange Multiplicity. One of Tully’s arguments in favour of multiculturalism draws on a supposed analogy between animal species and cultural groups: just as different species need different environmental conditions, different constitutional arrangements are, he claims, suitable for different human communities. Barry argues that the analogy fails because humans are members of the same species. He goes on to claim that the biological similarity of human beings has moral significance, writing that:  

precisely because human beings are virtually identical as they come from the hand of nature – at any rate at the level of groups – there is nothing straightforwardly absurd about the idea that there is a single best way for human beings to live, allowing whatever adjustments are necessary for different physical environments (Barry 2001: 262). 

In saying this he appears to have a means to defend the universal validity of liberalism that is not open to Rorty. For him, ‘socialisation ... goes all the way down ... [T]here is nothing  “beneath” socialisation or prior to history which is definatory of the human’ (Rorty 1989: xiii). Rorty has been widely criticised for this claim. Norman Geras takes it to mean that Rorty denies any sense to the idea of human nature, and he criticizes him for ignoring attributes that are shared by human beings cross-culturally and trans-historically (Geras 1995). Against his interpretation of Rorty’s claim that socialisation goes all the way down, Geras observes that there is a limit to human adaptability. We cannot, for example, be socialised so as to not feel pain or hunger. Traits such as these can, he argues, be used to build up a morality that is said to be potentially universal, in contrast to Rorty’s ethnocentric project of increasing human solidarity. 

It is however unclear, in pointing out that there are traits and characteristics shared by all human beings, how far Geras (and Barry) propose something that Rorty would not accept. The only content that Geras gives to human nature is that all humans are susceptible to pain and humiliation, and that our biology means that we require, amongst other things, food and shelter. With all of this, Rorty agrees. Regarding pain, he writes that:

our relation to the world, to brute power and to naked pain, is not the sort of relation we have to persons. Faced with the nonhuman, the nonlinguistic, we no longer have the ability to overcome contingency and pain by appropriation and transformation, but only the ability to recognize contingency and pain (Rorty 1989: 40, emphasis in original). 

Geras takes this to represent a contradiction in Rorty’s argument: ‘[i]t turns out, in other words, that there is a human nature’ (Geras 1995: 109, emphasis in original). But since Rorty has never denied the physical inescapability of pain, this merely demonstrates that Geras’s criticisms are misplaced, since he is pointing out something that Rorty has never claimed to deny. His rejection of human nature does not entail a rejection of biological needs which remain constant throughout the species; the point is rather whether such things can be given moral sense, whether biological needs are capable of generating substantive moral commitments or of providing guidance for future action. This he doubts: ‘we have a biology, a morphology, and a neurophysiology “definatory of ‘the human’.” The trouble is that such a physiological definition isn’t much use to us’ (Rorty 1992: 208). It isn’t much use, because not only is such a definition consistent with different moralities, but it does not offer any advice for us on how to choose between them. Many societies treat features, such as ‘male’ or ‘heterosexual’, to be the morally significant ones, and there is nothing in the notion human nature that makes the requirement for food and shelter the morally relevant category for appraising political regimes rather than these others.

Not only is the notion of human nature not of much use in deciding what to do, it is potentially damaging. Discrimination has historically been justified precisely by reference to biology, for example to the supposed natural inferiority of women to men, or blacks to whites. The answer to Geras’s question of how setting aside notions of a common human nature could help to secure justice and freedom – ‘one may be allowed to wonder how setting aside the universalist claim of a common human nature, as Rorty with currently so many others from this rather detached milieu would have us do, could conceivably help’ (Geras 1995: 4) – is that there are all manner of abhorrent beliefs that have been justified as arising from human nature, foremost among which is the supposed naturalness of denying political, civil and economic rights to women. 

In making naturalist claims, Barry is clearer than Geras that he is simply pointing out that which is obviously true, that all humans need certain basic things. There remains the question of how this translates into laws and institutions. His phrase ‘single best way for human beings to live’ suggests, even allowing for the qualification of differences in the physical environment, a specific content to the idea of what is good for human beings. This is a strong claim for a liberal to make, and Barry immediately qualifies it by saying that disagreements are inevitable because of the inevitability of different views about the true religion and the absence of a satisfactory way of resolving these disagreements (Barry 2001: 263). Given these qualifications, it is not clear that he is able to show this is enough either to mandate liberalism, or that it rules out (among others) a multiculturalist approach. 

In sum, when Barry writes of ‘the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favour of liberal egalitarian principles’, he is, I suggest, using the term ‘universal validity’ not in the Kantian sense but rather is concerned with the task of articulating and commending the fairness of liberalism to as many people as possible, ideally to humanity as a whole, and of justifying the legitimacy of such an enterprise in the face of criticisms from those he thinks moral and cultural relativists. His claim about human nature and Reason indicate, I suspect, that he sometimes thinks it insufficient simply to make claims for the political and moral advantages of liberalism. For Rorty, this is at best misleading: 

The idea of a universally shared source of truth called “reason” or “human nature” is, for us pragmatists, just the idea that such discussion [of the relative advantages of different moralities] ought to be capable of being made conclusive. We see this idea as a misleading way of expressing the hope, which we share, that the human race as a whole should gradually come together in a global community, a community which incorporates most of the thick morality of the European industrialized democracies (Rorty 1999a: xxxii, emphasis in original). 

I suggest, given the ‘thinness’ of Barry’s view of human nature, together with his acknowledgement of the need to specify the content of reason, that Barry would lose nothing by agreeing with Rorty and stick to seeking to argue for the moral and political advantages of liberalism.


Extending the scope of liberalism

Rorty’s clearest expression of his hopes for a global liberal polity is contained in his essay ‘Philosophy and the Future’. There he writes of the need for: 

a clear image of a specific kind of cosmopolitan human future: the image of a planetwide democracy, a society in which torture, or the closing down of a university or a newspaper, on the other side of the world is as much a cause for outrage as when it happens at home. This cosmopolis may be, in non-political matters, as multicultural and heterogeneous as ever. But in this utopian future cultural traditions will have ceased to have an influence on political decisions. In politics there will be only one tradition: that of constant vigilance against the predictable attempts by the rich and strong to take advantages of the poor and weak. Cultural tradition will never be permitted to override Rawls’s “difference principle,” never permitted to excuse inequality of opportunity (Rorty 1995: 203 – 204). 

This would, I think, serve as an accurate account of Barry’s ideal liberal polity. It is universal in the relevant sense in which rights are held irrespective of the state or community in which one happens to live. It allows for diversity among ways of life, but does not allow this diversity to erode the notion of equality before the law.  
 
It has been argued, however, that Rorty cannot or will not press for the extension of those advantages to countries that are not presently liberal (Kelly 2000; McLaren et al. 2001; Rumana 2000). As we have seen, this is inconsistent with Rorty’s stated position. Some may just be unaware of that position, but others seem to think Rorty cannot, despite his claims, press for the extension of liberalism as a consequence of his view that liberalism is not grounded in reason but is, rather, something that particular communities have come to adopt. From there, commentators seem to infer that commending one form of life to another is for Rorty impossible and/or illegitimate. Richard Rumana for example claims that on Rorty’s account, non-democratic countries may ‘stumble by accident upon democracy’ but cannot be persuaded into democracy by an ‘outside source’. (Rumana 2000: 88). Rumana takes Rorty to be denying any form of cross-cultural dialogue, philosophical or political, but it is unclear from the text whether he believes this is for Rorty impossible, perhaps because we cannot understand other cultures enough to communicate with them, or illegitimate, perhaps as a form of what is called ‘Western cultural imperialism’. These are, it should be noted, two different – though not necessarily inconsistent – claims: it is one thing to claim that cross-cultural dialogue is impossible because there are no universally valid standards grounded in reason or human nature; another to urge that it is the illegitimate imposition of the standards of one society on another. I will address these points in turn, suggesting that Rorty’s position in each case is the same as that of Barry. 


The possibility of extending the scope of liberalism

It is sometimes argued that comparisons between different cultures, languages and vocabularies are incommensurable, where this means ‘untranslatable’ or ‘mutually incomprehensible’ (see for example Gray, 1995). Barry notes that this view is self-refuting (Barry 2001: 265) and although Rorty is sometimes thought to endorse incommensurability (McLaren et al. 2001: 147), he in fact joins Barry in rejecting it. Following Donald Davidson, Rorty writes that it is self-refuting to claim that it is impossible to equate the meanings of terms in one language with those of another (Rorty 1991a: 25). Whilst it is true that there is no ‘meta-vocabulary’ into which all vocabularies can be fixed, ‘no permanent ahistorical metaphysical framework into which everything can be fitted’ (Rorty 1991a: 215), this does not entail that different vocabularies are mutually incomprehensible and thus that they cannot be compared. The very ability to recognise a language as a language in order to make a judgement about translatability already means that one has ascribed it meaning. As Rorty puts it, ‘I do not see how we could tell when we had come against a human practice which we knew to be linguistic and also knew to be so foreign that we must give up hope of knowing what it would be like to engage in it’ (ibid). One can compare different practices or values or forms of life, not against a permanent ahistoric metaphysical framework, but with respect to some particular standard or value. 

Viewing cultures to be incommensurability entails that they be thought of as containing essential components and as possessing a fixed structure. Barry rejects this mistaken view, citing with approval Alison M. Jaggar who writes that multiculturalists seem ‘to require an essentialized and naturalized conception of groups as internally homogeneous, clearly bounded, mutually exclusive, and maintaining specific determinate interests’ (Jaggar 1999: 314; quoted in Barry 2001: 11). This is of course, as Jaggar and Barry note, not what cultures are like. Although Rorty is sometimes thought to describe to cultural essentialism (Lukes 2003: 19), his account in fact complements Barry’s. He notes that cultures are not structures that constrain human thought and behaviour, but rather fluid patterns of thought and behaviour, and that as that behaviour changes, so do cultures. As he puts it, ‘[t]o think otherwise is the Cartesian fallacy of seeing axioms where there are only shared habits, of viewing statements which summarize such practices as if they reported constraints enforcing such practices’ (Rorty 1991a: 26). Cultures are not homogeneous or sets of criteria, but are constantly changing practices - a view which, he points out, ‘dispose[s] of the anthropologists’ distinction between the intercultural and the intracultural’ (ibid). That is to say, the difference between cultures is not different in kind to the differences within them: there is no reason to think that any two members of the same culture will have anything more in common with each other than two people from different cultures. 

Without endorsing cultural incommensurability and essentialism, Rorty might still be thought to deny the possibility of cross-cultural dialogue because of his rejection of a universal standard of rationality. This point is argued by Paul Kelly, who sees a significant difference between contemporary political philosophers stemming from their preparedness to go beyond the values of their own communities. Kelly argues that the concern to extend the scope and application of liberalism distinguishes writers like Barry and John Rawls from those such as Rorty and Michael Walzer. He writes that ‘[f]or Rorty, what political theorists try to defend on the ground of universal abstract rationality is merely what we happen to think around here’ (Kelly 2000: 233). The contrast Kelly sees with theorists like Barry and Rawls is however not that, unlike Rorty, they seek to deduce universal truths from universal abstract rationality, since like him they view reason to be conditional: ‘They do not, that is, proceed by way of deductions from the universal character of human reason but have a conditional character, although not one that does not necessarily undermine their claims of universality of scope’ (Kelly 2000: 238). They are all said to have given up on, or at least do not assume, universal human reason as something common to humans qua human. The difference is rather that Barry and Rawls are said to use this conditional account to move beyond or transcend the practices and values of particular communities, whereas Rorty (and Walzer) are held not to, leaving us to the contingencies of the circumstances in which we happen to find ourselves. 

As interpreted by Kelly, liberalism for Rorty ‘has no philosophical warrant, and cannot be the basis for a philosophical imperialism of the true and the good’ (Kelly 2000: 233). In a similar criticism, Harvey Siegel counters what he takes to be Rorty’s view that the contingency of values means that they have no cross-cultural application by writing that ‘the contingency of a culture’s beliefs, values and ideals does not entail that those beliefs, values and ideals have no legitimacy or force beyond the bounds of that culture’ (Siegel 2002: 40). Some ideals, he continues, ‘are legitimately applicable, and have force, … beyond all such cultural boundaries’ (ibid).

I have argued that there is no difference between Rorty and Barry on the question of rationality. To take up the other elements in Kelly’s discussion, his use of the term ‘philosophical imperialism’ is ambiguous. Philosophy can be viewed as a part of culture, much as one would identify drama as an aesthetic part; writers such as John Gray regard philosophy as an aspect of culture, hence his complaint that liberalism is a manifestation of Western cultural imperialism (Gray 1995: viii). Alternatively, philosophy can be viewed as a separate concern, as the attempt to provide a purely rational justification for exporting the ideas – cultural, moral, aesthetic, etc. – of one community to another. Rorty as we have seen certainly rejects this second sense of ‘imperialism’, thinking it philosophically incoherent. The claim that liberalism is more rational – when rationality is viewed, in Barry’s term, as a ‘bare notion’ (Barry 1995a: 8) – than for example religious orthodoxy cannot be sustained. Rationality must be given content, and this will be done in the light of particular values and therefore in such a way that some will find question-begging. Rorty does not think of philosophy as standing outside of culture, but as a part of it. Barry agrees, at least to the extent that he takes reason to require specific content, and they are united in agreeing that philosophical concerns are bound up with cultural ones. 

Moreover, the distinction between what Kelly calls ‘a conditional character’ and ‘merely what we happen to think around here’, together with the content of terms such as ‘philosophical warrant’ and Siegel’s terms ‘legitimacy’, ‘applicability’, and ‘have force’, all remain unspecified. Neither Kelly nor Siegel tell us whether they mean that a standard of warrant, legitimacy, or applicability exists independently of what anyone takes to be legitimate or applicable, or whether they simply think it morally acceptable to seek to export ideas. If they mean the latter, that advocating liberalism as worthy and desirable for societies that are currently not liberal, it is, I suggest, clear that Rorty agrees. He urges that we should create, not presuppose, universality, and makes this point by distinguishing ‘universal validity’ from ‘universal reach’ (Rorty 2001: 230). He argues that it is often the case that the best ideas are not somehow latent in human understanding or nature, but are the product of a very few people and societies. Values local in origin may nevertheless be worthy of wider application; their contingency does not mean that they may not be extended to societies that currently do not value them. As he puts it, ‘ideals may be local and culture-bound, and nevertheless be the best hope of the species’ (Rorty 1991a: 208). 

This explicitly political notion of universalism is central to Barry’s claim that the ‘point of liberalism is that it is universalistic’, for he goes on to say that liberalism ‘therefore necessarily conflicts with the claim that nations are the bearers of values that cannot, as a matter of principle, be overridden in the pursuit of liberal ends’ (Barry 2001: 138). Rorty speaks for example of desirability of Western organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders and the Peace Corps (Rorty 1999b). Thus, when Barry writes that cultural relativists think ‘that it would be “cultural imperialism” for liberals to bring pressure to bear on regimes that violate human rights in an attempt to increase the number of people in the world who enjoy their protection’ (Barry 2001: 140), Rorty is on this account at least not a cultural relativist. 


The legitimacy of extending the scope of liberalism
 
Some maintain, however, that notions such as universal validity are important, and cannot be reduced to purely political notions. For if they are, then we end up, as Rorty accepts, with a morality that is mandated not by reason or human nature, but that is the result of contingent historical circumstances. Rorty is happy to accept that this is the case with liberalism, but Barry is more ambiguous. He is clear that liberalism arose in a particular context. Criticising MacIntyre’s view that liberalism was a philosophical deduction from the Enlightenment, Barry argues that this is a fiction, and points out that liberalism is an historical development (as distinct from a conscious creation) of the Enlightenment. He goes on to point out that liberals like Rawls and Dworkin theorise from a particular historical context, the political and economic background of the New Deal settlement (Barry 1991: 119). However, he seems less prepared to recognise the contingency of liberal values when engaging with explicitly contextualist writers such as Walzer. In a discussion of Walzer’s account of ‘internal social criticism’, Barry writes that what is at issue when drawing on a tradition is ‘not who can claim most of the tradition but who can claim the best of it’ (Barry 1991: 18, emphasis in original). Elsewhere, he writes that he ‘draw[s] upon ordinary beliefs critically and selectively, employing a general theory of justice as a touchstone’ (Barry 1995a: 10). Here, it is not clear what the force of the word ‘general’ might be. For clearly it (‘the best’) is a liberal egalitarian theory, one which in response to MacIntyre he is keen to emphasise is itself informed by particular historical and socio-economic factors.

Barry’s position is thus rather closer to that of someone like Walzer than he would probably allow. Matt Matravers is I think correct when he suggests that Barry can be read in part as attempting to work out the implications of widely shared beliefs about fundamental equality (Matravers 1998: 119). This is of course to hit Barry where it hurts most, for it is to say, as Matravers intimates, that his account is itself a form of Walzerian interpretivism. But if we accept the distinction that Barry emphasises between a writer’s professed belief and the logic of their proposals (Barry 2002: 211), his probable refusal to accept the similarity with Walzer is not in itself a reason to deny it. His concern to stress his differences from writers like Walzer stems, I suggest, from a concern with what he takes to follow from their position. For Barry, their accounts are both critically impotent at home, and deny the possibility of criticising the standards of other societies (Barry 1995a: 3 – 10). However, the latter concern at least is eliminated if it is correct to say, with Rorty, that the localised origin of beliefs carries no necessary consequences for the extension of those beliefs. 

To recognizes the emptiness of notions of universal validity and yet remain convinced of the desirability of seeking to export liberalism might seem to be to propose a form of  ‘cultural imperialism’. Rorty has been accused of just this (Taylor 1991: 33; Haber 1994: 44). Those who warn against cultural imperialism however typically fail to distinguish the various ways in which ideas can be ‘exported’ in an effort to justify them to more and more people. Neither Taylor not Haber seem to recognise, let alone consider, the differences between (for example): allowing A Theory of Justice to be translated into Chinese, foreign sponsorship of indigenous reformist political movements, support for cross-national organisations such as Amnesty International, humanitarian aid, international military intervention, and wars of conquest. Rorty makes this point in a response to Taylor: 

Taylor calls me a “cultural imperialist” for saying that “truth and justice lie in the direction marked by the successive stages of European thought”. “Imperialist” is a fighting word, in the sense that it suggests images of the Conquistador’s horses and of Gatling guns. But I bet that Taylor too thinks that truth lies in the direction that leads away from Aristotle toward Darwin, and that justice lies in the direction that leads away from Marsilius of Padua and toward John Stuart Mill (Rorty 1991b: 77, emphasis in original).

The value of warnings of cultural imperialism are that they remind us that there is nothing intrinsically worthy about making claims for universality; liberals are joined with religious fanatics in viewing the scope of their doctrine to be universal. And to be sure, Barry recognizes that the charge of cultural imperialism is not always misplaced. Writing of Victorian attitudes towards clothing, he says:

One of the complaints against about Victorian “cultural imperialism” which is well founded is that Europeans (especially missionaries) tended to attribute universal moral significance to what in fact were simply the sartorial customs familiar to them from their own culture (Barry 2001: 287). 

That this discussion focuses only on clothing perhaps disguises the importance of this comment by one of the most universalistic of liberals. Barry would probably accept that there are many other beliefs, of Victorian missionaries and others, that have been exported, and that were not a source of enlightenment but rather were an illegitimate imposition. The blanket term ‘cultural imperialism’ hides, I suggest, two substantive issues. These are, first, how to distinguish proper moral outrage at the practices of other societies from prejudice – how, for example, to distinguish the liberal cosmopolitan and the Christian missionary – and secondly, when is it appropriate to commend and when to impose. 

Regarding the first issue, for both Rorty and Barry this distinction is ultimately made at the level of politics, not philosophy. They both suggest that liberalism is preferred by those who are able to choose. Countries that have experienced liberal rights and freedoms have, Rorty writes, liked them and sought to maintain them. ‘No country has tried them and willingly given them up, any more than any patient whose headaches have been relieved by aspirin has ever decided to cease using it’ (Rorty 2000b: 90). For Barry, liberal principles can be defended by noting ‘the choices actually made by people in a position to make choices’ (Barry 2001: 285). He notes that, given free choice, people universally prefer freedom to slavery, health to sickness, education to illiteracy, freedom to worship the religion of one’s choice (or to abstain from so doing) and to be able freely to join and participate in the social and political activities of one’s own choosing. 






If we give up reference to the universal validity of liberalism, how are we to achieve a global polity of the sort that Barry and Rorty both desire? One way would be to claim that liberal values form a part of the value system of every society, and that the task of the theorist ought to be to discover and propagate those values. Barry rejects this approach. Responding to what he takes to be Walzer’s view that cultures contain a distinct, homogeneous, and coherent set of values, Barry counters by pointing out that ‘[t]here is no such thing as a set of underlying values waiting to be discovered’ (Barry 1995a: 5). 

In saying this, Barry is once again in agreement with Rorty, who dismisses the task of seeking to identify cultural universals as fruitless (Rorty 1989: 51). Dropping the assumption of, as distinct from the aspiration to, universalism, Rorty substitutes the role of creation or invention in moral life. The important contrast for him is not the particular with the universal or the partial with the absolute, but the present with the future. Responding to the charge of conservatism and critical impotence, he admits that pragmatists such as himself cannot be radical, but urges that they can be utopian. Whilst they cannot burrow down behind appearance to reality, they can imagine and argue for a different, better future. He proposes that:

Instead of appealing from transitory current appearances to the permanent reality, appeal to a still only dimly imagined future practice. Drop the appeal to neutral criteria, and the claim that something large like Nature or Reason or History or the Moral Law is on the side of the oppressed. Instead, just make invidious comparisons between the actual present and a possible, if inchoate, future (Rorty 1998: 217). 

In saying this, he criticises what he takes to be a further problem with Kantian universalism, its potential conservatism. He takes Kant to be hostile to diversity and self-creation: ‘[u]niversalist philosophers assume, with Kant, that all the logical space necessary for moral deliberation is now available – that all important truths about right and wrong can not only be stated but be made plausible, in language already to hand’ (Rorty 1998: 203). However, as the case of feminism demonstrates, sometimes that language does not presently exist, and the purpose of philosophy should be to help create it. His claim might be summarised as saying that if a society contains values upon which the liberal can draw they should do so, but that if it does not, the liberal should, as the example of feminism illustrates, refuse to work within the boundaries of that moral world and seek instead to create her own. This position, I take it, is in accord with Barry’s view that political philosophers may ‘with luck eventually extend the boundaries of what is politically thinkable’ (Barry 1995b: 80). 
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